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VOLUME 20 FALL, 1965 NUMBER 1
DEFAULTING PURCHASER'S RIGHT TO RESTITUTION
UNDER THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT
RICHARD H. LEE*
This is the third in a series of three articles dealing with certain
aspects of the installment land contract. The first article' dealt with the
nature of the contracting parties' interests, primarily with the effect of
equitable conversion. The second' considered the remedies available to
the parties in the event of breach. This final article deals with a defaulting
purchaser's right of restitution and proposes a statutory solution to the
problems raised by forfeiture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever right a purchaser in default has to recover payments made
upon an installment land contract would seem to be the obverse of the
right of the vendor to declare a forfeiture. If the vendor can forfeit the
purchaser's payments, then obviously the purchaser cannot recover them.
But, by the weight of authority, the purchaser in default cannot recover
payments made, even though the contract contains no forfeiture clause.3
Thus, the vendor's right to retain the payments rests, not upon his right
to forfeit them, but upon the inability of the purchaser in default to
recover them.' When the purchaser's payment is in the nature of
earnest money, there need be no objection to the vendor retaining this
money upon the purchaser's breach. That is what the parties intended,
and even though it bears no relation to any provable damage to the
vendor, it is not so inequitable as to shock the conscience of most
courts, and even though it is a penalty, it is usually a reasonable one.5
But when an installment land contract is involved, the general rule,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. 19 U. MIAmI. L. REV. 361 (1965).
2. 19 U. MIAmi L. REV. 550 (1965).
3. Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881).
4. See Cody v. Wiltse, 130 Iowa 139, 106 N.W. 510 (1906).
5. But see Federal Land Bank v. Bridgeforth, 233 Ala. 679, 173 So. 66 (1937), where
a 500.00 dollar deposit on a purchase price of 8,000.00 dollars was returned to the purchaser
on the ground that it was a penalty.
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denying the purchaser in default recovery of payments made, operates
to increase the penalty in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the
breach. The result could well be shocking. Had a purchase money mort-
gage been used as the security device instead of an installment land
contract, equity would allow the vendor-mortgagee only the balance due
on the purchase price. Foreclosure by sale would adequately protect the
rights of the purchaser-mortgagor. While some courts have applied
general principles of equity to the installment land contract and reached
results similar to what might have obtained had there been a mortgage,6
the same jurisdiction may apply the general rule with sufficient frequency
to make the application of equity uncertain to say the least.7
The problem is the same whether it arises in a suit by the vendor for
strict foreclosure or to quiet title or, more directly, in a suit by the pur-
chaser in default to recover his payments. Is the defaulting purchaser
entitled to recover payments made which exceed the damage caused by
his breach? The general rule is that he may not. And yet, judicial atti-
tudes towards forfeiture, and, in a few states, legislative attitudes as
well, have operated to minimize injustice fairly well. Our real quarrel
with the state of the law in this area, however, is not so much that it
is unjust, but that it is uncertain.
II. THE MAJORITY RULE
At the outset it is well to observe that many of the cases where the
general rule is most ruthlessly stated are cases involving forfeiture of
earnest money only.8 These cases are not strong precedents for the
extension of the general rule to installment land contracts because earnest
money rarely exceeds ten percent of the purchase price and thus the
forfeiture is slight. Also, there is nothing shocking in the forfeiture of
earnest money because that was the very purpose for which it was paid.
It was intended to be forfeited should the purchaser default. This is so
not merely because the contract provides for its forfeiture, for that
would include forfeiture of all payments, but because it is the common
understanding of the parties that earnest money, or a binder as it is
sometimes called, is paid to evidence the purchaser's sincerity and that
he intends to forfeit it if he does not perform.9
When the earnest money cases are eliminated, outright forfeiture is
comparatively rare. Even in jurisdictions which adhere to the majority
rule allowing forfeiture, equity can prevent this result if it would be
manifestly inequitable. 10 The general rule is also frequently avoided in
6. Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559 (1962).
7. Williamson v. Wilson, 56 Idaho 198, 52 P.2d 138 (1935).
8. Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
9. Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d (1953).
10. Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
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many states which purport to follow it by a finding that the vendor
acquiesced in the purchaser's breach and thus rescinded the contract,
allowing the court to order restoration of payments made." A small
minority of jurisdictions have renounced the general rule and have taken
a position firmly opposed to forfeiture. 2 We shall consider first the
factors whereby those courts purporting to follow the majority rule are
able to avoid its harsh application.
Faced squarely with the situation where a purchaser is in default and
is unable to cure that default, and the vendor not only is not in default,
but also stands ready to perform, a court which purports to adhere to
the majority position would be hard put to find some excuse to allow the
purchaser to recover the excess of his payments over the damage caused
by his breach.
But how often is this the case? After the purchaser's continued
default there will come a time when the vendor will want to be relieved
of his obligation to perform. He may wish to sell to a third person or
he may wish to keep the land for his own use. In any event he will have
abandoned all thought of performing himself. Can he do this and still
retain the purchaser's payments? The majority rule says that he can.
But his change of attitude as to his own performance opens avenues of
escape from the strict rule of forfeiture should the court desire to make
use of them.
A forthright escape from unjust forfeiture is to restrict the applica-
tion of the majority rule to cases where it works an equitable result.
This would permit forfeiture of earnest money" and yet would prevent
a forfeiture under circumstances that shock the conscience of the court.
4
Unfortunately, unless such a judicial policy is clearly articulated and
extended to every area of forfeiture, confusion will be the result. In
Florida, where the supreme court has intimated that it has adopted this
policy, uncertainty exists as to how great the forfeiture must be before
it becomes unenforceable. Apparently forfeiture without judicial inter-
vention is still permitted in Florida. 6 A decision denying forfeiture upon
general principles of equity without expressly disavowing the majority
rule is apt to be an anomaly.' 7
11. E.g., Bohlin v. Jorgensen, 341 Il1. App. 281, 93 N.E.2d 89 (1950).
12. Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16,
230 P.2d 629 (1951).
13. Beatty v. Flannery, supra note 8.
14. Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., supra note 10.
15. Ibid.
16. Huguley v. Hall, 141 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 157 So.2d 417
(Fla. 1963).
17. See Ruhl v. Johnson, 154 Neb. 810, 49 N.W.2d 687 (1951). But see Abbas v.
Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W.2d 265 (1949). See also Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R.I. 332, 128
Atl. 217 (1925). But see Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 17 A.2d 869 (1941).
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Less forthright, but perhaps more convenient, is a finding by the
court that the vendor, who now no longer desires to perform himself,
has accepted the purchaser's breach and thus has rescinded the contract.
If he has "rescinded" he is obligated to restore the purchaser's payments.
But what activity by the vendor will convert a breach by the purchaser
into a rescission? Merely resuming possession of the property will not
be sufficient if the vendor does no other act inconsistent with the existence
of the contract. In Power v. North,8 the purchaser sought to recover
his initial payment of 333.33 dollars on a total price of 1,000.00 dollars.
The purchaser was clearly in default. The contract contained a provision
for rescission in the event that the purchaser failed to perform, but the
court held that this provision was for the exclusive use of the vendor
and that even he could only exercise it before payment of any part of
the purchase price; otherwise he might be able to forfeit the purchaser's
payments when "but a shilling remained unpaid." This would indicate
that the court was aware of the injustice of forfeiture. However, the
purchaser was unsuccessful in his suit for restitution because the con-
tract was considered to be in full force and effect. The action of the
vendor in quietly resuming possession was deemed not inconsistent with
this result and the court further stated that had the vendor resorted to
ejectment, this act still would not have amounted to a rescission. 9 This
decision leaves the vendor in a somewhat difficult position. The implica-
tion is that once he treats the contract as not binding upon him he will
be deemed to have rescinded and will be obligated to make restitution.
If he does not rescind, his offer remains open to the purchaser who thus
has what amounts to an equity of redemption unlimited in duration.
This problem would be solved to the satisfaction of the vendor if
he could somehow forfeit the contract rights of the purchaser. Fore-
closure by sale would dispose of the purchaser's right to purchase, but
it would not allow the vendor to keep the land and the payments as well.
Strict foreclosure would be more to the vendor's liking although there
would always be the possibility that the purchaser might cure his default.
The ideal solution would be to make time of the essence and to provide
for forfeiture of all the purchaser's payments upon a breach. But would
the courts permit it? Most would. In fact, the majority rule goes even
further and purports to deny restitution to the purchaser in default
where there is no forfeiture clause.20 The requirement implicit in Power
v. North, that the vendor keep the contract alive in order to resist
the purchaser's claim to restitution, has been reduced to a requirement
that the vendor must not be in default at the time he elects to abandon
performance himself.2
18. 15 S. & R. 12 (Pa. 1826).
19. Id. at 15.
20. Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950) (forfeiture provision invalid).
21. Glenn v. Price, 337 Ill. App. 637, 86 N.E.2d 542 (1949).
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Nonetheless, the vendor must act with care or a court may find that
he has rescinded or that he is in default himself. A mere default on the
part of the purchaser does not work a forfeiture of his rights even when
there is a forfeiture clause unless the vendor elects to forfeit. Even if the
forfeiture clause were self-operating, it would seem that it was for the
vendor's benefit and that he could waive it. Therefore, a proper election
must be made to terminate the purchaser's rights or the purchaser may
still compel the vendor to perform the contract. 22 If the vendor wrong-
fully attempts to forfeit the purchaser's interest this puts the vendor in
default and the purchaser may recover his purchase money. 2 Also, a
resale by the vendor, after the purchaser's default but without any notice
of forfeiture having been given, has been held to entitle the purchaser to
a refund of his payments. 4
The absence of a forfeiture clause generally should not prevent a
vendor from declaring a forfeiture. Even if time is not made of the
essence by the contract, the vendor may make it so by giving reasonable
notice. And if the purchaser persists in his default the vendor may forfeit
the payments already made even though the forfeiture clause is non-
existent or invalid as a penalty. 2 But the vendor must be extremely
careful not to waive the time clause or the forfeiture provision. Mere
inactivity by the vendor upon the purchaser's breach may be enough to
constitute a waiver. 6
The lack of a forfeiture clause has been given weight in permitting
the purchaser in default to recover. In Howard v. Stillwagon,28 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a rescission where the vendor, under
a contract lacking a forfeiture clause, brought ejectment. The purchaser
in default was allowed restitution of his payments. However, in a recent
Pennsylvania case, Kaufman Hotel & Rest. Co. v. Thomas, 9 where the
contract apparently did not provide for forfeiture, the same court
refused to allow recovery of installments paid by the purchasers in default
despite the fact that the vendors had ejected them. This lack of con-
sistency is not unusual in jurisdictions purporting to follow the general
rule. Hard cases are said to make bad law; in this instance they merely
make confusion.
In some jurisdictions which adhere to the majority rule, if the court
can be induced to dwell upon the penal nature of the forfeiture provision,
the very existence of a forfeiture clause may be an aid to the purchaser
22. County of Lincoln v. Fischer, 216 Ore. 421, 339 P.2d 1084 (1959).
23. Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wash. 2d 70, 240 P.2d 931 (1952).
24. Thompson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 110 Mont. 521, 105 P.2d 683 (1940).
25. Beatty v. Flannery, supra note 20.
26. County of Lincoln v. Fischer, supra note 22.
27. Pierce v. Staub, 78 Conn. 459, 62 Atl. 760 (1906).
28. 232 Pa. 625, 81 Aft. 807 (1911).
29. 411 Pa. 87, 190 A.2d 434 (1963).
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in default in recovering his payments. In Biddle v. Biddle,30 a case from
Michigan, a state which clearly adopts the majority position denying
restitution, 1 the court held that the forfeiture of 15,000.00 dollars was so
out of the range of actual damages as to render the forfeiture clause void.
For this reason the purchaser was enabled to recover the 15,000.00 dollar
down payment, made on a total price of 300,000.00 dollars, despite the
default. The size of the deposit and the fact that the purchaser was
insolvent, thus leaving the general creditors to bear the loss, undoubtedly
influenced the decision.
A recent federal case, decided upon principles of Oregon law indi-
cates that the size of the amount forfeited is not necessarily controlling.
The contract in Tovrea v. Alderman,3 2 provided that in the event of the
purchaser's default he should forfeit his 50,000.00 dollar deposit and
should be further liable for actual damage not exceeding 200,000.00
dollars. In the suit to recover the deposit it was held that in view of
the fact that the contract remedy precluded the vendor from specific
performance, he need give no notice before declaring a forfeit and might
repudiate the contract and retain the deposit. In justifying forfeiture,
the size of the forfeit was referred to as less than two percent of the
purchase price. Size in percentages is frequently less impressive than
the same size expressed in dollars, but, inasmuch as in both Tovrea and
Biddle the percentage was far below the customary ten percent deposit,
the cases are difficult to reconcile.
Illustrative of the difficulty in determining the defaulting purchaser's
right to refund is another recent case based upon Oregon law. In
Morrison v. Kandler,5 both parties were advised by competent attorneys
at all phases of their dispute; the case was argued and submitted and
one year later was reargued and resubmitted. The final judgment deny-
ing restitution was dissented from by the Chief Justice and one other
judge. This case concerned the sale of a farm for 51,500.00 dollars pay-
able in installments, wherein the purchaser had made payments totaling
19,735.00 dollars. The suit was brought by the vendors for strict fore-
closure; the purchasers counterclaimed for rescission and restitution.
Prior to bringing suit, the vendors attempted to retake possession of the
property because of certain minor breaches by the purchasers. The pur-
chaser's children resisted the ousting, whereupon the vendor brought the
suit to foreclose. The purchasers then cured their defaults, and on the
advice of counsel declared a rescission and demanded the return of their
money. The vendor reluctantly reassumed possession but did not dis-
continue his suit, and it was then that the purchasers filed their counter-
30. 202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918).
31. Henry v. Rouse, 345 Mich. 86, '75 N.W.2d 836 (1956); Nelson v. Hacker, 278
Mich. 383, 270 N.W. 720 (1936) ; Crenshaw v. Granet, 237 Mich. 367, 211 N.W. 636 (1927).
32. 211 F. Supp. 865 (D. Ore. 1962).
33. 215 Ore. 489, 334 P.2d 459 (1958).
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claim. The court, commenting that the purchasers were relying upon the
well-established rule that where a vendor wrongfully attempts to forfeit
the purchaser may rescind, held that the vendors did not give proper
notice to effect a forfeiture and that the purchasers, by ignoring the
attempted ouster, by curing their defaults and by remaining in possession,
did not accept the ouster as a forfeiture. Furthermore, the suit for strict
foreclosure was a nullification of the defective forfeiture and extinguished
the purchaser's right to rescind if, in fact, any such right existed. Thus,
the court held that when the purchasers attempted to rescind after the
commencement of the suit, they did so at their peril. At this point, the
court stated that the vendors were not in default, that the purchasers
had no right to rescind and that by resuming possession and selling
certain personal property which was covered by the contract the vendors
had not disabled themselves from performing. The court allowed a strict
foreclosure after giving the purchasers six months to redeem.
It is apparent that the so-called majority rule can be so harsh in its
application that few, if any, jurisdictions adhering to it are prepared to
apply it as a rule of law. Its avoidance has resulted in strained inter-
pretations of the facts and a lack of uniformity in the decisions.14 It is,
in fact, not so much a rule as it is a convenience in those cases where
restitution would be unjust to the vendor and an obstacle where the
equities are the other way.
III. MINORITY POSITIONS
Three states are considered as having a firm rule against forfeiture:
California, Connecticut, and Utah.85 Of these three, California, since
Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish,"
is probably the most securely on the side of restitution. Maryland has
enacted a statute3 7 designed to prevent forfeitures in certain cases and
various other states have, from time to time, balked at applying the
general rule when the result would be too inequitable."8
A. California Law
California is particularly interesting in that at one time it adhered
to so harsh a concept of forfeiture, one so clearly stated that its
eventual overturn was almost inevitable. In 1898, the Supreme Court
of California, in Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co.,89 undertook
an extended examination of the rights of a purchaser in default for
the purpose of clarifying the law. In Glock the purchaser, under a typical
34. See Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).
35. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 19 (1953).
36. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
37. MD. CoDE ANN. art. 21, §§ 110-116 (1964).
38. E.g., Biddle v. Biddle, 202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918).
39. 123 Cal. 1, 55 Pac. 713 (1898).
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installment land contract, was suing for restitution of payments made.
The contract provided for the sale of land for a total price of 625.00
dollars, payable in installments of 125.00 each year. The vendor remained
in possession and for an additional 375.00 dollars agreed to plant fruit
trees and cultivate them; this sum was also payable in installments. In
addition, the contract called upon the purchaser to pay all taxes, made
full performance by the purchaser a condition precedent to delivery of a
deed by the vendor, made time of the essence, and provided that if the
purchaser failed to perform, the vendor was released from all further
obligation and might retain payments made as liquidated damages. The
purchaser paid a total of 382.50 dollars, the first two installments. There-
after, he did nothing for some three years. But, six months after the
date when all the payments should have been paid, the purchaser tendered
1,000.00 dollars, the total amount due, and demanded a deed, or, in the
alternative, a return of payments. Upon the vendor's refusal, the pur-
chaser brought suit.
The court listed what it believed to be the pertinent provisions of the
California Code. They were: section 3306, setting forth the English
rule of damages for a breach by the vendor; section 3307, providing for
damages for loss of bargain in the event of the purchaser's breach; sec-
tions 1670 and 1671, limiting liquidated damages to cases where actual
damage would be extremely difficult to prove; section 3384, providing
for specific performance; section 3387, setting forth the presumption
that damages for breach of a contract to sell land were inadequate; and
section 3389, which provided that a contract which was specifically
enforceable was not rendered otherwise by a provision for liquidated
damages or a penalty. 0
Not mentioned by the court were two other provisions of the Cali-
fornia Code which seem particularly pertinent. They were:
Section 3275- Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party
thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture,
by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be
relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other
party, excepting in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraud-
ulent breach of duty.
41
Section 3369.1- Relief not granted to enforce penalty, forfeiture
or penal law: 1. Neither specific nor preventive relief can be
granted to enforce a penalty or a forfeiture in any case, nor to
enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance or unfair com-
petition.
42
After discussing the remedies of vendor and purchaser in general,
the court proceeded to uphold liquidated damage clauses generally in
40. Id. at 5-6, 55 Pac. at 714.
41. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3275.
42. CAL. CiviL CODE § 3369.1.
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land contracts on the ground that, just as specific performance lay be-
cause of the inadequacy of damages, land contracts were within the
exception of section 1671 as damages were extremely difficult to prove.
However, the court went further and said, "if it be said that the clause
for stipulated damages is void, still the vendor is entitled to retain the
money."48 The only occasion on which the purchaser was deemed entitled
to a return of his payments was in the event that the vendor agreed to a
mutual rescission and abandonment of the contract. The action of the
vendor in the particular case in merely retaining the land as well as
the payments was held not to constitute a rescission, but rather to be an
affirmance of the contract. The court relied upon the contract provision
making full payment by the purchaser a condition precedent to any
obligation by the vendor and held that this relieved the vendor of any
duty to make a declaration of forfeiture. Needless to say, the lower
court holding, allowing the purchaser restitution, was reversed.
Faced with so harsh a rule, so explicitly set forth, the California
courts soon began to adopt the ameliorating devices necessary to under-
cut the rule but without destroying it. Waiver,44 estoppel,45 mistake48
and the distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent 7 were
all used to achieve substantial justice within the rule set forth by Glock.4
During this period, the court recognized the existence of code section
3275, but it was not prepared to make use of it to the fullest extent. 9
It was not until 1949, that the California Supreme Court dispensed with
the rule of the Glock case and in three decisions over the next two years
placed California squarely against forfeiture and on the side of restitu-
tion at the suit of a defaulting purchaser.
Barkis v. Scott5" was a suit by a vendor to quiet title against a
purchaser who had made substantial improvements to the property and
who, after having made fifty-seven payments on time, issued two
monthly installment checks which were dishonored for insufficient funds.
The purchaser immediately tried to cure his default upon notice of the
forfeiture, but the vendor was adamant. Pointing out that a purchaser
who is seeking to keep the contract alive is in a better position to secure
relief than one who is seeking to recover his payments, the court found
that the default was not grossly negligent, willful, or a fraudulent breach
of duty and that thus it was covered by section 3275. This finding was
contrary to that of the trial court which had found a willful and grossly
43. Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 2, 55 Pac. 713, 714 (1898).
44. Boone v. Templeman, 158 Cal. 290, 110 Pac. 947 (1910).
45. McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal. App. 244, 116 Pac. 380 (1911).
46. Troughton v. Eakle, 58 Cal. App. 161, 208 Pac. 161 (1922).
47. Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496, 2 P.2d 776 (1931).
48. For a detailed discussion of this development see Howe, Forfeitures in Land Con-
tracts, CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 1953-1954, 417, 457-465 (1955).
49. McDonald v. Kingsbury, supra note 145.
50. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
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negligent breach of duty. Glock was distinguished, but not overruled,
on the ground that in Glock the purchaser could not qualify for relief
under section 3275 because of the nature of his default.
In Baffa v. Johnson,51 the defaulting purchaser sought to recover a
5,000.00 dollar down payment made under a contract to purchase a
motel for 93,000.00 dollars. The purchaser was in willful default and
had abandoned the contract. He thus would not have been entitled to
relief under section 3275. However, he argued that inasmuch as section
3369 provides that "neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted
to enforce a penalty or forteiture in any case" 52 he should be entitled
to recover despite the nature of his default. The court found it unneces-
sary to deal with this argument on the ground that, in any event, the
purchaser had failed to prove that the vendor's damages occasioned by
the breach were less than the amount of the down payment. Thus, al-
though denying restitution, the court left open the question of the
applicability of section 3369 to a case where the money paid was proved
to be in excess of the damage suffered.
Finally, in Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St.
Matthias Parish,5" the question left open in Baffa was answered. In this
case the purchaser sought specific performance of a contract to purchase
land for 18,000.00 dollars upon which he had made a deposit of 2,000.00
dollars. The contract provided for a clear title subject, however, to
covenants, conditions, restrictions, reservations, rights, rights of way
and easements of record. At the time when the purchaser was called
upon to make further performance, he was informed that there was an
existing easement held by the water department across the rear five feet
of one of the lots. The purchaser thereupon wrote to the vendor repudi-
ating the contract and demanding his money back. The vendor did not
pay back the money, but proceeded to sell the property to another
purchaser for 20,000.00 dollars, 2,000.00 dollars more than the plaintiff's
contract called for. The plaintiff did offer to go through with the pur-
chase prior to the vendor's resale, but only upon condition that the
existing easement be abandoned. The court held that the plaintiff's
repudiation of the contract was a total breach and that it was not with-
drawn until after the vendor had acted upon it by selling to a third party.
The plaintiff's offer to comply upon condition of removal of the easement
was held to be a counter offer and not a timely withdrawal of the repudia-
tion. Hence, specific performance was denied.
However, the court then proceeded to consider the question of restitu-
tion, the question raised, but unanswered, by Baffa. Pointing out that
because of the willful nature of the default the purchaser would not be
51. 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369.
53. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
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entitled to relief under section 3275, as applied in Barkis and reiterated
in Baffa, the court nonetheless allowed restitution of the excess of the
down payment over the damage caused by the breach. In arriving at
this conclusion, the court observed that any other result would be in-
consistent with section 3294 which restricts exemplary damages to ac-
tions other than upon a contract, and with sections 1670 and 1671 which
limit liquidated damages to cases where the damages would be difficult
to ascertain. In this case the action arose from contract, and in view of
the second sale, it was obvious, so the court held, that no damage was
occasioned by the breach. The court further stated that unless restitution
were allowed, the anomolous situation would arise wherein a vendor
seeking to quiet title would be compelled to make restitution under
section 3369, but a purchaser seeking restitution by direct action would
be unable to obtain it. Thus, upon identical fact situations, the rights
of the parties would turn upon the chance of which party first sought
the aid of a court. Allowing the vendor 900.00 dollars paid by him as
a broker's commission on the first sale, the court compelled him to repay
to the defaulting purchaser the remaining 1,100.00 dollars of the pur-
chaser's deposit. Glock was still not disapproved, but distinguished upon
the same ground that it had been distinguished in Barkis, namely that
there the purchaser was unable to prove that the vendor's retention of
the payments would result in the imposition of punitive damages.
Freedman, left open but one avenue whereby a vendor might retain
a deposit. If the deposit were in fact intended as liquidated damages,
and if there had been no subsequent sale and if "it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix actual damage,"54 then a retention of the
deposit is presumptively valid.55 In view of the fact that in Freedman
the degree of difficulty in ascertaining actual damage was determined
not at the time of the making of the contract, but rather was established
upon the subsequent sale, it would seem that in any case the purchaser
in default could offer evidence of value despite the lack of a subsequent
sale and thus stand a good chance of proving that actual damage could
be fixed. But the question is still open. In the recent case of Caplan v.
Schroeder," Justice Traynor, who wrote the majority opinion in Freed-
man again spoke for the majority and, while allowing restitution to the
defaulting purchaser, commented at length on the failure of the vendor
to attempt to sustain his retention of the payment as a liquidated damage.
California today has reached a position diametrically opposed to
that taken in Glock. It has done so in characteristic judicial fashion by
distinguishing and redefining previous positions. It has relied heavily
upon statutes, but the statutes were there from the beginning. The result
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671.
55. Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 23,
230 P.2d 629, 633 (1951).
56. 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321 (1961).
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of this reform has been to strip the vendor of his most potent weapon,
forfeiture. It has been suggested, however, that the advantage gained
by the purchaser has not been commensurate with the restriction placed
on the vendor.17 Professor Hetland, in commenting on the effect of the
decisions upon this aspect of the vendor-purchaser relationship, has said,
"Except as misused, the installment land contract is an obsolete security
device in California.
' 58
The positions of Connecticut and Utah are also considered as being
firmly against forfeiture but are not so clear as that of California.59
B. Connecticut Law
The installment land contract is apparently rarely used in Connecti-
cut. It has been suggested that the case of Pierce v. Staub,60 places Con-
necticut firmly against forfeiture.6' It was the only Connecticut case
cited by Corbin in his much cited article "The Right of a Defaulting
Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid.' 62 An examination of
Shepard's Atlantic and Connecticut Citations and the cases listed therein
indicates that Pierce has been cited but once in a case involving real
property and that did not concern an installment land contract. Connec-
ticut apparently treats forfeitures arising from land contracts in the
same fashion that it treats forfeitures generally, not differentiating be-
tween sales of goods and sales of land.
Pierce v. Staub, was a suit by the administrator of a deceased pur-
chaser to recover payments made by the purhaser upon an installment
land contract. The contract was for the sale of both real and personal
property for a total price of 150,000.00 dollars; it contained no forfeiture
clause. The purchaser had paid 60,000.00 dollars towards the purchase
price at the time of his death and until the last was endeavoring to pay
the balance. The vendor granted several extensions of time, but finally
gave notice that unless payment was made by a named date he would
consider the property as divested of all interest which the purchaser
might have. Even after the purchaser's death, the vendor informed his
widow that if payment of the balance due was made within thirty days
he would convey the property to the purchaser's heirs. No payment was
even tendered. The vendor eventually resold the property to a third
party. The court in allowing restitution to the purchaser's estate treated
the vendor's resale as equivalent to a formal and mutual rescission. In-
asmuch as the vendor made no claim to damages for the breach, the
court allowed restitution of the entire amount of the payments. It was
57. Hetland, Land Contracts, CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT, § 2.20 (1960).
58. Ibid.
59. Supra note 35.
60. 78 Conn. 459, 62 At. 760 (1906), cited in 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 19, n.30 (1953).
61. Supra note 35.
62. 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
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suggested that the vendor, instead of deciding for himself to work a
forfeiture, should have brought the purchaser into court to have their
respective rights adjusted."
The Pierce case is even more favorable to the purchaser than are
the present California decisions. Baffa v. Johnson6" placed the burden
upon the defaulting purchaser to prove that the vendor's damages did
not exceed the amount of the payments, but Pierce would require affirma-
tive action by the vendor to prove his own damage. However, the cases
are distinguishable as the Pierce contract had no forfeiture or liquidated
damage clause, and the payment in Pierce was over one third of the price,
whereas in Baffa it was less than one eighteenth. The court in Pierce
commented upon the lack of a forfeiture clause 5 but apparently did
not base its decision upon it. The Connecticut court cited and relied upon
an old Connecticut case, Hickock v. Hoyt,66 which allowed restitution to
a purchaser in default because the seller had failed to prove that he had
been damaged by the breach. However, Hickock was concerned with the
sale of wine, not land.
Shortly after the Pierce case, a purchaser of an automobile relied
upon Pierce as a defense to a suit upon a check given in part payment.
In American Auto. Co. v. Perkins, 7 the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut refused to allow the defense despite the fact that the seller
apparently was not damaged at all by the purchaser's breach. The court
explained the Pierce case as allowing restitution only where the seller
refused to perform or had disabled himself from performing by a subse-
quent sale. In this case the seller of the automobile had made no tender
of the car but apparently could still deliver if the buyer demanded. The
contract price of the car was 4,045.00 dollars upon which the buyer had
given his check for 500.00 dollars. The court did not consider how long
the seller must remain ready to perform. The effect of the decision was
to leave the buyer with the alernative of specifically performing his
contract by paying 3,545.00 dollars more, or having his 500.00 dollars
forfeited. As thus explained, the Connecticut rule is less favorable to
the purchaser in default than is California's where the purchaser is
entitled to a return of his deposit in any case where the vendor can be
shown to have suffered no damage.6"
However, in Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v.
Gaynor Mfg. Co.,69 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut relied
heavily upon Pierce v. Staub, in allowing restitution to a defaulting buyer
63. 78 Conn. 459, 466, 62 AtI. 760, 763 (1906).
64. Supra note 51.
65. 78 Conn. 459, 466, 62 AtI. 760, 763 (1906).
66. 33 Conn. 553 (1866).
67. 83 Conn. 520, 77 AtI. 954 (1910).
68. Freedman v. Rector, supra note 55.
69. 98 Conn. 721, 120 At. 572 (1923).
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of bullets. Presumably a seller of bullets would be able to fill an order
so long as he remained in business, but the court found that the seller
had treated the contract as at an end and therefore had rescinded and
could not keep the payments made. The case seems indistinguishable
from, and in conflict with, American Auto. Co.
70
In Segal v. Mooney,7' a Connecticut common pleas court finally
had the opportunity to apply Pierce v. Staub to a land contract. The
purchasers had paid 500.00 dollars down on a contract to buy land for
24,000.00 dollars and later changed their minds. They brought suit for
restitution relying solely upon Pierce v. Staub. The vendor who had
since sold the property, filed no counterclaim for damages but merely
alleged generally that he had been damaged more than the amount of
the deposit. The purchasers argued that under Pierce v. Staub, the sale
worked a mutual rescission and that they were entitled to restitution.
The court, after distinguishing Pierce v. Staub, on the broad equities,
said, "It would seem to be unjust and inequitable to invoke the fiction
of a mutual rescission even on the conceded facts."72 The court justified
the vendor's subsequent sale of the property on the ground that it would
have been in vain for him to have kept the land in view of the purchaser's
refusal to perform. Thus, the act of disabling himself from performing
does not give rise to a rescission, and Connecticut would seem to be back
where it started from before Pierce v. Staub, relying upon the general
equities of each particular case, allowing forfeiture in some cases and
denying it in others. This is an eminently equitable solution, but one
which invites litigation. The result is that in any given case an attorney,
being unable to determine his client's rights under an installment land
contract, would deem it prudent to make use of some other form of
security for the purchase price of land. This may account for the in-
frequent appearance of the installment land contract in the Connecticut
decisions.
C. Utah Law
Because of the strong language condemning forfeiture in the leading
case of Malmberg v. Baugh,73 Utah is frequently considered as belonging
to the minority of jurisdictions which favor restitution and do not
permit forfeiture. The Malmberg case was quoted from and heavily
relied upon by the California Supreme Court in Freedman.74 But despite
this case, the Utah decisions seem rather to place Utah with those states
which follow the majority rule, but openly disregard it when the equities
of the case are such that forfeiture would be shocking to the conscience
of the court.75
70. Supra note 67.
71. 15 Conn. Supp. 41 (C.P. New Haven 1947).
72. Id. at 45.
73. 62 Utah 331, 218 Pac. 975 (1923).
74. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 20-21, 230 P.2d 629, 632 (1951).
75. E.g., Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
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Malmberg was a suit by a vendor to recover the rental value of
the premises contracted to be sold for the period after default and service
of notice to vacate until the purchaser finally moved out, approximately
six months. The purchasers' answer alleged that they were induced to
enter the contract by the vendor's fraud, sought affirmative relief to
rescind the contract for fraud, and demanded a return of payments made
in excess of the rental value of the property. This was a case of first
instance in Utah, and the court, after castigating the majority rule as
unconscionable, allowed restitution upon the terms demanded by the pur-
chaser. The contract in the Malmberg case contained no provision for
forfeiture or for liquidated damages. The purchaser had paid almost half
of the purchase price at the time of the default, and that, coupled
with the circumstance that the vendor was the moving party, would be
enough not to make the result exceptional in many jurisdictions follow-
ing the majority rule." Nonetheless, the reasoning of the opinion in
Malmberg indicates stern disapproval of forfeiture and recognizes the
great potential for injustice existing in the majority rule. The court
stated:
The vital question to be determined is: What is the correct
measure of damages in a case of this kind? Shall we apply the
rule of compensatory damages, or is it a case in which punitive
damages should be allowed? Upon what principle can punitive
damages or damages in excess of compensation for the injury
done be justified in the case at bar? These are questions that
appeal both to the judgment and conscience of the court.77
The rule contended for by respondent, carried to its logical
sequence, would forfeit every dollar paid by appellant and still
leave respondent in possession of the land even if appellants had
paid the last installment but one, and then defaulted. In answer
to this, it may be said that such is not the case at bar. But
where are we going to draw the line?
7
1
However, in 1942, the same court, in Christy v. Guild,79 cast some
doubt upon the strength of this resolution. Christy v. Guild was an
unlawful detainer action brought by the vender who had declared a
forfeiture under the terms of the contract. The purchase price was
3,200.00 dollars payable in monthly installments. The purchaser, in
his answer, alleged that he had paid forty-nine installments totalling
1,645.67 dollars and in addition had made improvements costing 2,000.00
dollars and, on appeal, questioned the propriety of the lower court's
affirmation of the forfeiture and summary removal without a considera-
tion of the equities. The purchaser also contended that the clause in
76. Cf. Haynes v. Dunstan, 104 S.W.2d 1025 (Mo. App. 1937); Howard v. Stillwagon,
232 Pa. 625, 81 At. 807 (1911).
77. Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 340, 218 Pac. 975, 978 (1923).
78. Id. at 345, 218 Pac. at 980.
79. 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942).
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the contract providing for forfeiture of payments made as liquidated
damages was, in fact, a penalty provision and hence void. In response
to the purchaser's arguments the court stated:
Assuming that such an issue [consideration of the equities]
may properly be raised in an action such as this, we must con-
clude that the forfeiture provision of the contract is just what
it purports to be and not a penalty. The contract provided for
no down payment. The monthly installments to be made were
20.00 dollars for the first six months; 25.00 dollars per month
for the next six months; and 30.00 dollars per month from then on
until the entire sum had been paid. While appellants offered to
prove that 2,000.00 dollars worth of improvements had been
made on the premises, such proof would not aid their cause since
it was admitted that the net monthly income from the premises
was 75.00 dollars. Such a monthly income would more than com-
pensate for the improvements made, plus the monthly install-
ments. In view of the use value of the premises as compared to the
monthly installment to be made, including improvements also
made, we cannot say that the forfeiture provision was such that
the trial court should have held it to be a penalty and refused to
permit respondents to maintain an action based on the invoking
of such provision of the contract.80
The judgment of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of the vendor
was affirmed.
How deeply involved the Utah courts have become in weighing the
equities in forfeiture is illustrated by Perkins v. Spencer."' The suit was
originally brought by the vendor as an unlawful detainer action to
recover property allegedly forfeited by the purchaser's default. The
purchaser had the action removed to a higher court where he sought
cancellation of the contract. The vendor relied upon the forfeiture clause
which permitted him to retain payments made as liquidated damages.
In overruling the trial court and allowing restitution to the purchaser,
the court construed the liquidated damage clause as a penalty because
it would result in a forfeiture of 2,725.00 dollars on a total price of
10,500.00 dollars and such a result was deemed unconscionable by the
court. Christy was distinguished on the equities, although the percentage
of purchase price paid in Christy was greater than in Perkins. Also, there
were no improvements in Perkins as contrasted with the substantial
amount of improvements alleged in Christy. The case was remanded to
determine the difference between the vendor's damages and the amount
of the payments made by the purchaser. Perkins stands for the proposi-
tion that the validity of a liquidated damage clause shall be determined
by hindsight, an equitable proposition, but one which introduces con-
80. Id. at 322, 121 P.2d at 405.
81. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
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siderable uncertainty into contractual relations and is an invitation to
litigation.
In 1958, the Supreme Court of Utah, the same court which decided
Perkins, upheld a forfeiture and distinguished Perkins on the equities.
Carlson v. Hamilton,82 was a straightforward suit by a purchaser to
recover payments made under an installment land contract. A total of
6,680.00 dollars had been paid on a price of 22,000.00 dollars. The trial
court, after making allowance for damage to the premises and for the
two year rental value during the period when the purchasers were in
possession, found that the payments exceeded this amount by 2,119.94
dollars. The purchasers were awarded judgment for this amount. The
Supreme Court of Utah reversed. Although justifying the forfeiture on
the ground that it would only silghtly exceed the real estate commission
that would have to be paid on a resale of the property, the supreme
court's language is reminiscent of Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony
Co. 3 and not in keeping with the spirit of Malmberg v. Baugh.84
People should be entitled to contract on their own terms
without the indulgence of paternalism by the courts in the
alleviation of one side or another from the effects of a bad
bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into contracts
that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to hard-
ship on one side. It is only where it turns out that one side or
the other is to be penalized by the enforcement of the terms of
a contract so unconscionable that no decent, fairminded person
would view the ensuing result without being possessed of a pro-
found sense of injustice, that equity will deny the use of its
good offices in the enforcement of such unconscionability. We
think no such case is presented here.85
Such language manifests a degree of irritation with the efforts of
defaulting purchasers to recoup their payments and suggests that the
trend in Utah may be away from restitution and back towards the
majority rule in its strict form. In any event, the standard of a "decent
fairminded person" is apt to be uncertain and productive of more
litigation.
D. The Maryland Statute
In 1951, Maryland enacted a statute86 to protect certain purchasers
from the rigors of the general majority rule, still followed in those cases
which do not come within the provisions of the statute.17 The statute
82. 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 (1958).
83. Supra note 39.
84. Supra note 73.
85. Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 274-275, 332 P.2d 989, 990-991 (1958).
86. MD. CODE ANN. art. 21, §§ 110-116 (1964).
87. Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d 517 (1958); Great United Realty Co.
v. Lewis, 203 Md. 442, 101 A.2d 881 (1954); see note, 19 MD. L. REv. 51 (1959).
1965 ]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
only applies to contracts where the total purchase price is not over
15,000.00 dollars88 where the price is to be paid in at least five install-
ments exclusive of the down payment,89 where the property is to be used
as a dwelling house by the purchaser, ° and where the purchaser is not
a corporation.9 ' The vendee is given the right to accelerate installment
payments92 and the vendor may not encumber the property nor place
any mortgage upon it in an amount greater than the balance due, nor
may the payments on any such encumbrance exceed the installment
payments.9 3 The statute further provides that upon a default by the
purchaser during the existence of the contract he must be given a thirty
day notice to cure his default,9 4 and only upon his failure to do so may
the vendor resort to his sole remedy, power of sale. 5
The heart of the statute is a provision giving an option to the
purchaser to demand delivery of a deed upon the giving of a purchase
money mortgage once the payments made total forty percent of the
purchase price. 6 The curtailment of the vendor's remedies gives him
fewer rights during the existence of the contract than he will have if
the purchaser elects to take a deed and give back a mortgage when
forty percent of the purchase price has been paid. In the latter case,
he has all of the remedies of a mortgagee because he is, in fact, a mort-
gagee, whereas until the contract is executed and while it is still in
force, he is restricted to a power of sale under the Maryland statute
permitting such sales in the foreclosure of mortgages.9 7 However, the
Maryland power of sale combines the virtues of extra-judicial sale
with the conclusiveness of judicial sale in such fashion that it is probably
quite adequate to protect the vendor during the life of the contract. The
sale must be confirmed by the court 8 and thus is res judicata as to the
validity of the sale.9
The greatest weakness of the Maryland Installment Land Sales
Statute is that its application is limited to sales of less than 15,000.00
dollars. The threat of forfeiture is not a risk exclusively of the poor, al-
though perhaps the drafters assumed that purchasers of more expensive
homes would be advised by attorneys and thus would not need legislative
aid. The equation of the installment land contract with the mortgage,
which is the effect of the statute, is probably not a deterrent to the use
88. MD. CODE ANN. art. 21, § 110(3) (1964).
89. Id. § 110(1).
90. Id. § 110(3).
91. Id. § 110(5).
92. Id. § 112(3).
93. Id. § 112(6).
94. Id. § 113(1).
95. Id. § 115.
96. Id. § 112(7).
97. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66, § 5 (1964).
98. Id. § 5(b).
99. Bachrach v. Washington United Co-op Inc., 181 Md. 315, 29 A.2d 822 (1943).
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of such contracts due to the peculiar efficacy and conclusiveness of the
power of sale in Maryland. However, such an approach in other juris-
dictions would burden the contract with the delays and costs of fore-
closure by court order and would destroy the contract's attractiveness to
vendors.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In no jurisdiction is the treatment accorded the parties to a land
contract satisfactory. A strict and undeviating application of the majority
rule that a party in default cannot recover payments made will result
in unconscionable forfeiture.' ° The application of general equitable
principles in an effort to avoid forfeiture makes for uncertainty.' The
use of waiver and rescission as a means of protecting the defaulting
purchaser frequently involves straining the facts and almost invariably
will cause a lack of uniformity among the decisions of even the same
jurisdiction. 1 2 The results obtained in the so-called minority jurisdictions
are equally unsatisfactory. California labored for many years to shake
off the majority rule only to adopt a position which has rendered the
installment land contract virtually obsolete as a security device in that
state.'0 ' Connecticut and Utah illustrate most of the inconsistencies of
those jurisdictions which claim to follow the majority rule.
The advantages of the installment land contract are that it enables
the vendor to obtain security without the expense and delay attendant
upon the use of a mortgage and permits the purchaser to buy land with-
out the cash outlay required by a mortgage. Its principal disadvantage
at the present time is that the potential for abuse, inherent in its form,
is so great that courts are reluctant to give uniform enforcement to its
provisions. The goal of any reform in the treatment accorded the install-
ment land contract should be to preserve as many of its advantages as
are consistent with securing the purchaser against unjust forfeiture, and
at the same time permit the contract to operate under a clear and recog-
nized standard so that the effect of the purchaser's breach may be
predicted.
It is apparent that any reform will have to be statutory. The com-
mon law rules in this area are so deeply embedded that judicial reform
is unlikely, and even if it is achieved, as it was in California, the result
is apt to destroy the usefulness of the device. Statutory reform along the
lines adopted in Maryland which would treat the contract as another
100. E.g., Iowa R.R. Land Co. v. Mickel, 41 Iowa 402 (1875).
101. E.g., compare Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950), with Haas v. Crisp
Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
102. E.g., compare Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Gaynor Mfg. Co.,
98 Conn. 721, 120 AtI. 572 (1923), with American Auto. Co. v. Perkins, 83 Conn. 520, 77
Atl. 954 (1910).
103. See Hetland, Land Contracts, CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT, § 2.20
(1960).
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form of mortgage would seem of little value in most jurisdictions which
do not make such intelligent use of the power of sale as does Maryland.
What is needed is a statute which will recognize the rights of the pur-
chaser, particularly the right of a purchaser in default to be secure
against unjust forfeiture, and at the same time will permit the vendor
a simplified, inexpensive and fairly rapid means of foreclosing the pur-
chaser's rights in the event of a default.
Any statute should take into account the specific weaknesses of the
common law treatment. As an example, the failure to distinguish between
the deposit receipt agreement and the installment land contract is a
source of much confusion. The deposit made upon a deposit receipt
agreement almost always is made as earnest money and its forfeiture is
not only contemplated by the parties but the payment of the deposit
is made with the express understanding that the purpose of the deposit
is to establish a certain sum that is to be forfeited in the event of the
purchaser's breach. This purpose is absent, however, when dealing with
the installment land contract where the effect of forfeiture of payments
made is to increase the penalty as the seriousness of the breach diminishes.
Any proposed statutory solution also should define reasonableness in
a liquidated damage clause so that there would be no question as to its
validity. In land contracts, a liquidated damage provision is almost
a necessity in view of the difficulty of proving loss of bargain damages.
The statute should further provide for a return to the purchaser of all
payments made in excess of the liquidated damages and a determination
of the distinction between valid liquidated damages and invalid penalties
should no longer be left to hindsight.
The statute should further require that the contract be recorded, or
at least that it be given to the purchaser in recordable form, so that he
may have the protection of the recording acts if he so desires. Various
additional protections to the purchaser may be included such as the
Maryland provision limiting the amount of the encumbrance which the
vendor may place upon the land under contract.104 It would seem, how-
ever, that if the contract be recorded, any subsequent encumbrancer
would take subject to the contract regardless of statutory protection.
The statutory provisions for summary foreclosure of the purchaser's
rights should be available only to vendors who have used a contract
complying with all of the statutory requirements. A failure to qualify
for the statutory remedy, however, should not merely leave the contract
outside of the statute, as is the case in Maryland. The statute should
restrict its benefits to those who comply with its requirements, but, to
avoid a total bypassing of the statute, it should require that all other
contracts must be foreclosed as mortgages under the mortgage law pre-
104. MD. CODE ANN. art. 21, § 112(6) (1964).
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vailing in the jurisdiction. Strict foreclosure should be abolished. The
remedies of ejectment and suit to quiet title should not be available out-
side of the statute or, if available, only upon repayment by the vendor
of all payments made. Suits for specific performance and suits for dam-
ages for breach of contract still should be available to either party
whether the contract is within the statute or not.
V. A PROPOSED STATUTORY SOLUTION
A. Land Contracts
The interest of every purchaser in default under a contract
for the sale of land in this state upon which the purchaser shall
have made a payment in money or money's worth shall be free
from forfeiture regardless of the provisions of the contract.
Nor, upon the failure of any purchaser to cure a default, shall
his interest be subject to strict foreclosure by any court other
than as provided herein. The only means whereby a vendor
may foreclose the rights of a purchaser in default shall be by
foreclosure under the laws of this state pertaining to mortgage
foreclosure, as though the vendor were a mortgagee and the pur-
chaser a mortgagor. Provided, however, that if the contract for
the sale of lands be either a Sales Contract or a Security Con-
tract as herein defined then the vendor may avail himself of the
rights contained in the contract and the remedies herein set
forth.
A. A Sales Contract is a contract for the sale of land which
provides for a transfer of the legal title and for the payment of
the total price, or part payment thereof and substitution of some
other form of security, within a period of ninety (90) days or
less. It must:
1. be acknowledged by the vendor and be in such
form as to be capable of being recorded;
2. provide for delivery of a deed after not more than
two payments exclusive of any deposit;
3. contain no provision for forfeiture of all payments
made nor a provision for the retention, as liquidated dam-
ages, of any payments made exceeding ten (10) percent of
the purchase price;
4. provide for restitution to the purchaser in default
of any payments made in excess of the amount set forth in
the liquidated damage clause;
5. provide for delivery of the legal title to the pur-
chaser not more than ninety (90) days after the date of
the first payment as provided by the contract;
6. provide that the contract shall be null and void
ninety (90) days after the date of the first payment as
provided by the contract and that it shall cease to be a
cloud upon the vendor's title as of that time.
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No procedure shall be required to remove the cloud of such
a contract upon the vendor's title, nor shall resort to foreclosure
in the event of the purchaser's default be required. Ninety (90)
days after the date of the first payment such contract shall be
a nullity unless action be commenced by either party for specific
performance or for breach of contract within such ninety (90)
day period.
B. A Security Contract is a contract for the sale of land
which provides that the vendor retain the legal title as security
for the payment of the purchase price, or a substantial portion
thereof, for a period exceeding ninety (90) days from the date
of the first payment made under the contract. It:
1. must be acknowledged by the vendor and be in
such form as to be capable of being recorded;
2. need not provide for delivery of the legal title
within any specified period of time;
3. need not provide for any specified number of pay-
ments;
4. must provide for prepayment of the balance due
without penalty at the option of the purchaser upon ninety
(90) days written notice to the vendor;
5. must contain no provision for forfeiture of all pay-
ments made, nor provision for the retention, as liquidated
damages, of any payments made exceeding ten (10) per-
cent of the purchase price;
6. must provide for restitution to the purchaser in
default of all payments made in excess of the amount set
forth in any liquidated damage clause.
To remove the cloud upon the vendor's title in the event of
the purchaser's default in the payment of one or more of his
installment payments the following strict foreclosure proceeding
is available to the vendor.
1. The contract must be recorded.
2. The vendor must file and record:
a. proof of notice to the purchaser of his default
and of intent to use this statutory procedure;
b. proof of the giving of a sixty (60) day period
of grace after the giving of such notice in which period
the purchaser may cure a first default. If the sixty
(60) day period of grace shall have been given on a
previous default and the default was cured within the
period, then only a thirty (30) day period of grace
need by given on a second default. After two defaults
and two previous grace periods given, the vendor need
give no further period of grace to a defaulting pur-
chaser;
c. proof of restitution to the purchaser in default
of all payments made in excess of the liquidated dam-
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age clause contained in the contract, or if there be no
liquidated damage clause, proof of restitution of all
payments made by the purchaser.
All of this proof may be made in a single affidavit. Upon
the filing and recording of this affidavit any interest in the land
subject to contract which the purchaser may have had is fore-
closed.
Nothing in this statute is to be construed as denying to any
party to a land contract the right to bring suit for damages for
breach, for specific performance, or for restitution of any thing
of value which may have been conferred pursuant to or as a
result of such contract.
The suggested statute affects all contracts for the sale of land upon
which the purchaser has made any payment or given anything of value.
If no payment has been made, the statute does not apply and the con-
tract will be dealt with under the common law of the jurisdiction. In
other words, it is still an enforceable obligation; equitable conversion
and all the rights incident to equitable conversion will remain unaffected.
The contract will constitute an encumbrance on the vendor's title, but.
his removal of such an encumbrance can be accomplished by existing
means without danger of injustice to either party.
When payment has been made under a land contract, there exists
a danger of unjust forfeiture. This is all that the statute is designed to
prevent. Compliance, or lack of it, with the statute does not render
any contract less binding nor does it restrict the remedies of either party
in furtherance of the contract purpose. Actions for damages by either
party may still be maintained. Specific performance will remain avail-
able to the purchaser provided he is not in default, and, in the case of
the sales contract, provided he commences his action within ninety
days from the execution of the contract. Specific performance also will
be allowed the vendor, even though it may result in sale of the land by
court order and a mere foreclosure of the vendor's lien; this will be by
order of chancery where the prevailing results are generally equitable.
In the event that the contract is not within the statute or that the vendor
refuses to comply with the statutory procedures, the purchaser may
have restitution, and unless foreclosed in equity, or unless the vendor
resorts to the statute, the contract remains an encumbrance upon the
vendor's title. In summary, all that the statute purports to do is to out-
law forfeiture and to give the vendor a choice between foreclosure by
judicial sale, as in the case of a mortgage, and summary foreclosure by
compliance with the statute.
There is a marked contrast between this proposed statute and the
statute proposed by the New York Law Revision Commission in 1937.105
105. New York Law Revision Commission Report 351 (1937).
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The New York proposal provides for termination by the vendor upon
thirty days notice to the vendee of his default. If the vendor elects to
terminate and the purchaser does not cure his default within the grace
period, then the burden of recovering the excess of payments over the
vendor's damage is shifted to the purchaser who is given the right to
sue for restitution. By its failure to provide a reasonable provision for
liquidated damages, the proposed New York statute would seem to be an
invitation to litigation by the purchaser.
The proposed New York statute also permits the vendor to sue for
installments, but requires that he have a marketable title at the time of
suit. This is aimed at a real weakness of the existing law in that a
vendor may, theoretically, compel the purchaser to make all of the pay-
ments and yet be unable to perform himself on the payment of the last
installment. However, the same end is sought to be achieved in the
statute proposed herein by allowing the purchaser to prepay upon ninety
day notice and thus place the vendor in default at any time he is in-
secure as to the state of the vendor's title. Admittedly, this is of small
value to a purchaser during the early life of the contract when his equity
is so small that he may not be able to secure other financing to enable
him to prepay the balance on the contract. But his risk at this time
is correspondingly small, and to require a constant marketable title of
the vendor seems somewhat unrealistic. The purpose of the statute
proposed herein is to recognize the purchaser's interest as being a sub-
stantial one and to prevent its destruction without a consideration of the
equities of all the parties.
